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1 Introduction
Are we reborn after death? Do we continue existence in a different body,
after our current body has died? A positive answer to these questions relies
on certain cosmological assumptions: For us to be reincarnated after death,
there have to be, first of all, enough bodies around into which we may be
reincarnated. Provided that there are enough bodies, the question of reincar-
nation then becomes primarily a puzzle about personal identity. It involves
the question of whether one is the same person as certain (past or future)
individuals. Some people who believe in reincarnation derive their conviction
from religious or spiritual beliefs. But as a question of cosmology and per-
sonal identity, reincarnation is also open to be investigated through secular
argument.
Michael Huemer (forthcoming) recently proposed just such an argument,
employing Bayesian confirmation theory. According to him, our existence
at any time is a probability-zero event unless we are infinitely reincarnated.
Hence, upon observing our existence at the present time we should become
confident of our own immortality.
In this essay, I argue that Huemer’s argument is ultimately unsuccessful.
It fails to show that we should update in favor of infinite reincarnation upon
observing the present time. I will then go on to propose a new argument
for immortality. Here’s the plan: I start by reconstructing Huemer’s original
argument (Section 2). I then say why I think it’s unsuccessful: It fails to
account for the total evidence we gain from observing the present time. In
particular, it neglects certain essentially de se evidence (Section 3). I then
present a new argument for reincarnation (Section 4). The argument takes
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its cue from the well-known Sleeping Beauty puzzle. It argues that, if the
popular “thirder” solution to the puzzle is true, then one should become
confident of reincarnation upon learning of one’s own existence. Finally, I
discuss the argument’s limitations (Section 5). I argue that whether our
evidence confirms immortality depends on what can be assumed about the
qualitative makeup of the universe; in particular, about how many lives are
lived in total, given each incarnation hypothesis.
2 Huemer’s Argument Reconstructed
I’ll start by reconstructing Huemer’s argument. Let SI (singular incarna-
tion) be the conjunction of two theses: first, that the universe is temporally
infinite in both directions; and second, that you are incarnated (born) exactly
once. (Huemer calls the same hypothesis R, for ‘restricted view of personal
identity’.) It excludes the hypothesis of infinite reincarnation, II. Hypoth-
esis II also has two parts: first, that the universe is temporally infinite in
both directions; second, that you exist but that there is no time at which
you are first incarnated, nor a time at which you are last incarnated. On II,
you are infinitely reincarnated throughout the universe’s history.
For simplicity, Huemer considers a partitioning of the time axis into
countably infinitely many centuries. One can then write down a prior prob-
ability function that assigns values to any given century t expressing the
prior probability of your being born in t. One way to understand the prior
probability function is as encoding epistemic norms in the absence of any
evidence at all. In particular, such a probability function permits non-trivial
updating on hypotheses which the agent has already known (so-called ‘old
evidence’). Examples of old evidence may include facts such as whether or
when the agent is alive.1 Huemer simplifies further by assuming that the life
of any of your incarnations is with certainty fully confined to a single cell of
the partition. This way, the prior probability of your being born in t equals
the prior probability of your being alive in t.
Suppose your evidence entails that you exist at a particular century. Con-
sider then the prior probability of this evidence, conditional on each of the
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two incarnation hypotheses. If one finds that the evidence is better supported
by II than by SI, then one may conclude, from the Bayesian conception of
evidence, that one’s evidence confirms II over SI. This is Huemer’s basic
argumentative strategy.
More explicitly, the argument goes like this.
(A) Indifference: The prior probability P of the time of your
(unique) incarnation, conditional on SI, is uniform over the cen-
turies.2
From (A) and the probability axioms, it follows:3
For all t, P (I am alive at t|SI) = 0. (1)
Huemer requires a crucial second premise for his argument, which he does
not explicate. Call it
(B) Probable existence given reincarnation: For any cen-
tury t, the probability of your existence at t conditional on II is
non-zero:
For all t, P (I am alive at t|II) > 0. (2)
Finally, Huemer assumes the Bayesian conception of evidence:
(C) Bayesian conception of evidence: If H and H ′ are hy-
potheses with P (H) > 0 and P (H ′) > 0, then evidence E con-
firms H overH ′ iff P (E|H) > P (E|H ′). (For anyH with P (H) >
0, the conditional probability is defined as usual: P (E|H) =
P (E∧H)
P (H) .)
From (A), (B), and (C), one can conclude
(D) “Existence Is Evidence of Immortality”: My evidence
(for some t) that I am alive at t confirms II over SI.
Why believe Premise (A)? It follows from an application of the Principle
of Indifference:4
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(PI) If there is no reason to favor (epistemically) one possibility
over another, then the two possibilities have the same probability.
It seems that, a priori, there is no reason to favor one century as the time
of one’s incarnation over any other century. According to PI, each century
should thus have equal probability of containing me. Conditional on SI—
unique incarnation—PI then implies uniformly zero probability for each cen-
tury. In this essay, I wish to grant the application of PI to the question of my
temporal location. And so I accept part of the above argument: Conditional
on SI, the prior probability of any century containing me is zero (Premise
(A)).
What about Premise (B)? It’s not entirely obvious that the probability
that I’m alive at t, conditional on infinite reincarnation, is greater than zero.
(For this to be the case, the uncountable subset of infinite sets of centuries
specifying when I’m alive and which contain t has to have non-zero measure.)
There may be ways to argue for this.5 At any rate, here I’ll grant Premise
(B).
What I object to, rather, is a further implicit assumption about the total
evidence we gain from observing our present time. What I learn is not merely
that I exist at t. Rather, I learn also that t is now. Once this additional
evidence is accounted for, observing the present time no longer serves as
evidence for immortality.
3 The Lottery Analogy—Total Evidence Considered
3.1 The Argument
Suppose an agent observes her present time and then contemplates multiple
reincarnation. I claim that the agent’s epistemic situation is importantly
analogous to the following case.
(Lottery) You are presented with a 100-ticket lottery. Of the
100 tickets an unknown number are winning tickets. More specif-
ically, you are told that either the lottery contains only a single
winning ticket, or ten winning tickets. The game master, who
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knows which tickets are winning tickets, reveals to you the num-
ber of some winning ticket. You are told that he does this by
selecting a ticket at random from among the subset of winning
tickets. The ticket number that’s revealed is number 34.
How should learning that number 34 is revealed affect your credence that
there are many winning tickets? You might think that your credence shouldn’t
change. Whether the revealed ticket is number 34, or some other number,
intuitively doesn’t tell you much about how many winning tickets there are.
But there is an analogue of Huemer’s argument to the conclusion that you
should become more confident that there are many winning tickets. After
all, that number 34 is a winning ticket is more likely if there are many win-
ning tickets. But in this case the Huemer-style argument clearly fails, for it
ignores the procedure by which the game master selects ticket number 34.
This is easy to see formally. There are only two possibilities: either
one out of the 100 tickets is a winning ticket, or ten are. Call these hy-
potheses OneWinner and TenWinners respectively. It’s true that, conditional
TenWinners, the probability of 34 being a winning ticket is higher—ten times
higher—than conditional on OneWinner:
P (#34 wins|TenWinners) = 1/10,
whereas
P (#34 wins|OneWinner) = 1/100.
However, our evidence is not merely that 34 is a winning ticket. We also know
that 34 has been revealed specifically by a random selection over the subset of
winning tickets. Given that 34 is a winning ticket, its being thus revealed is
less likely—ten times less likely—conditional on TenWinners than conditional
on OneWinner: P (#34 revealed|#34 wins ∧ TenWinners) = 1/10, whereas
P (#34 revealed|#34 wins∧OneWinner) = 1. For, conditional on 34 winning
and there being a total of ten winning tickets, there are in any case nine
other tickets the game master could have revealed. Meanwhile, if 34 is the
only winning ticket, the game master is guaranteed to reveal it. Overall, we
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recover the intuitive result that 34’s being revealed doesn’t tell us anything
about the total number of winning tickets in the lottery:
P (#34 revealed|OneWinner)
=P (#34 revealed ∧#34 wins|OneWinner)
=P (#34 revealed|#34 wins ∧OneWinner) · P (#34 wins|OneWinner)
=1 · 1/100
=1/100,
and
P (#34 revealed|TenWinners)
=P (#34 revealed ∧#34 wins|TenWinners)
=P (#34 revealed|#34 wins ∧ TenWinners) · P (#34 wins|TenWinners)
=1/10 · 1/10
=1/100,
(Note that ‘#34 revealed’ entails ‘#34 wins’ and thus ‘#34 revealed’ is the
same proposition as ‘#34 revealed ∧#34 wins’.)
The analogy with the incarnation setup arises since prior to observing our
temporal location we have irreducibly indexical uncertainty. Given Huemer-
style indifference assumptions, this indexical uncertainty plays an analogous
role to the game master’s random selection of a ticket over the subset of win-
ning tickets. Including this indexical information renders our total evidence
neutral on the question of infinite reincarnation.
The parallel between the setups is best illustrated first by a finite incar-
nation setup:
(Finite Universe) The universe has a total lifespan of only 100
centuries (and you know this). You entertain two rival hypothe-
ses: first, that you are alive in precisely one of those centuries
(SIf ); second, that you are alive in precisely ten of those cen-
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turies (IIf ). In each case you are a priori ignorant about which
century or centuries you are alive.
Given this setup, upon being incarnated in century t, you are initially uncer-
tain about what century it is. When you learn that it’s t, you acquire new
information.
Does observing my temporal location in (Finite Universe) provide evi-
dence for multiple (ten-fold) reincarnation over singular incarnation? Note
that SIf and IIf both entail that you are alive sometime. Given that SIf
and IIf have non-zero prior probability, we can write this as
P (I am alive sometime|SIf ) = P (I am alive sometime|IIf ) = 1. (3)
Further, initially make the following assumption: that learning the purely
de se hypothesis that one is alive now should not change one’s confidence in
SIf or IIf . Let’s call this assumption6
No Update From Pure Indexical:
P (I am alive now |SIf ) = P (I am alive now |IIf ).
For simplicity, in the following derivation I will regard P as already condi-
tionalized on ‘I am alive now’. Given No Update From Pure Indexical, this
presupposition won’t distort our assessment of the degrees of confirmation
afforded to the incarnation hypotheses by our total evidence.
(At this point I should explicate a linguistic difference between Huemer
and me: At times, Huemer describes the evidence you acquire upon observing
your temporal location as ‘I am alive now ’. But he means by this not a rather
trivial piece of de se information. Rather, in Huemer’s usage, it is supposed
to express, for some t and some person p, the proposition that p is alive at t.
Note that, while Huemer also treats the ‘I’ in ‘I am alive’ as de re, I treat it
as de se. This difference won’t matter substantively in what follows.)
By a finite analogue of Huemer’s argument, we can show—correctly—that
IIf makes it more likely that I am alive at t: A priori, I have no reason to
favor any one ten-element subset of centuries over any other ten-element set
as the set of centuries where I am alive. And so PI implies equal probability
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for each such subset. Since exactly 1/10 of those subsets have me exist at t,
it follows that
P (I am alive at t|IIf ) = 1/10. (4)
Analogous reasoning for SIf yields
P (I am alive at t|SIf ) = 1/100. (5)
If my total evidence consisted solely in ‘I am alive at t’, an update in
favor of IIf upon observing my temporal location would be warranted. But
my evidence is more specific. Upon observing my temporal location, I also
acquire the de se information that t is now.
Now, if I’m singularly incarnated, then my being alive at century t means
I’m alive only at century t. Given that I am alive now (which we assume
doesn’t influence my probability in SIf or IIf ), the fact that I am alive only
at century t entails with certainty that it’s now century t. That is,
P (t is now|I am alive at t ∧ SIf ) = 1. (6)
By contrast, the analogous inference for multiple reincarnation IIf isn’t
permitted with certainty. Given IIf , the information that I am alive at t
means that t is merely one out of a total of ten centuries where I am alive.
If I know that I am alive now and that t is among ten centuries where I
am alive, then PI suggests a mere 1/10 probability that t is now. This is
because, for any given ten-element subset of centuries of which one is t, I
have no particular reason to favor any member of the subset as being the
current century. Thus, by PI,
P (t is now|I am alive at t ∧ IIf ) = 1/10. (7)
Putting Eqs. (4), (5), (6), (7) together, we get
P (E|SIf ) = P (E|IIf ) = 1/100, (8)
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where E is our total evidence, ‘t is now ∧ I am alive at t’. (Given the in-
formation that I am alive now, ‘t is now’ entails ‘I am alive at t’. Thus
‘t is now’ suffices to capture our total evidence here. So we can also write
P (t is now |SIf ) = P (t is now|IIf ) = 1/100.) And so our total evidence no
more supports multiple reincarnation than singular incarnation. An update
in favor of multiple reincarnation is unwarranted.7
This is not to say that there aren’t situations in which learning about
one’s temporal location does warrant an update in favor of multiple reincar-
nation. This is typically the case if the information about one’s temporal
location(s) is learned without the stronger indexical proposition. Suppose
a time-traveling alien grants you access to a Cosmic Demoscope: a large
database, listing for every century all the persons alive in that century. Sup-
pose you pick some century c at random, to look up its entry in the Demo-
scope. To your amazement, you find that you are alive at c. In this case, you
are warranted to update in favor of multiple reincarnation. This is because
in this case you don’t learn any relevant indexical information. You learn the
proposition that you are alive at c. (You also learn the somewhat stronger
proposition that you learn this fact by perusing the Demoscope. But the
posteriors we care about here are unaffected if you instead update on the
weaker proposition.) But you don’t learn that it’s currently c (nor any other
century).
Similarly, if in the lottery case you simply pointed to ticket number 34
and demanded that it be revealed to you—irrespective of whether it is a
winning ticket or not—then, upon learning that it is indeed a winning ticket,
you should become more confident that there are many winning tickets.
It remains to turn to the case of infinite reincarnation. The calculations
remain essentially the same. The probability that I’m alive at t vanishes, by
PI, conditional on SI. The probability that it’s currently t, conditional on my
being alive at t and SI, is 1. It’s a bit harder to ascertain the probability that
I’m alive at t, conditional on infinite reincarnation (as mentioned earlier).
But grant that it is non-zero. It won’t matter in the end, for the probability
that it’s currently t, conditional on my being alive at t and the truth of
infinite reincarnation, simply vanishes. For infinite reincarnation induces
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infinite indexical uncertainty (in the same way as finite reincarnation induces
finite indexical uncertainty). Putting all this together, we have
P (E|SI) = P (E|II) = 0, (9)
where E is ‘t is now ∧ I am alive at t’, as above. Once the total evidence is
in, you shouldn’t update in favor of immortality.8
3.2 Interlude: Irreducibly Indexical Evidence
At this point one might raise one of two objections. One might doubt that
we do acquire irreducibly indexical evidence when observing our temporal
location. Or one might grant that we acquire such evidence, but that the
evidence shouldn’t be treated in the way I suggested. I shall briefly address
both worries.
Start with the first. By ‘irreducibly indexical’ I mean that the evidence
can’t be satisfactorily translated into any de dicto proposition.9 In claiming
this, I am leaning on influential arguments by (among others) Lewis (1979)
and Perry (1979). Lewis famously imagines a scenario involving two gods,
omniscient about all de dicto facts in the world, but nonetheless ignorant
about certain de se facts:
“[Two gods] inhabit a certain possible world, and they know ex-
actly which world it is. Therefore they know every proposition
that is true at their world. ... Still I can imagine them to suffer
ignorance: neither one knows which of the two he is. ... One
lives on top of the tallest mountain and throws down manna;
the other lives on top of the coldest mountain and throws down
thunderbolts. Neither one knows whether he lives on the tallest
mountain or on the coldest mountain; nor whether he throws
manna or thunderbolts.” (Lewis, 1979, pp.520-1)
Each god has indexical uncertainty about which god he is. But ex hypothesi
the two gods know all de dicto facts. Thus their indexical uncertainty can’t
be uncertainty de dicto.
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Examples analogous to the two gods can be constructed involving the
Cosmic Demoscope. We could imagine the Demoscope to be extended to
grant its user exhaustive de dicto knowledge about her world. Suppose the
agent consulted the extended Demoscope, and found out that she is alive
at century t. She would still be ignorant about what time it is now. This
suggests that her temporal-indexical evidence is not reducible to any de dicto
fact.
Another well-known argument for the irreducibility of temporal de se
evidence is the argument from cognitive significance. John Perry (1979) fa-
mously raises this argument, via examples such as the tardy professor :
“[A] professor, who desires to attend the department meeting on
time, and believes correctly that it begins at noon, sits motionless
in his office at that time. Suddenly he begins to move. What
explains his action? A change in belief. He believed all along
that the department meeting starts at noon; he came to believe
... that it starts now.” (ibid., p.4)
Perry argues that no de dicto translation of the professor’s de se evidence
can satisfactorily explain his action. Notably, at noon the professor has two
distinct pieces of evidence: that he starts moving at noon (which in principle
he might have known before), and that noon is now. The evidence we receive
when observing our temporal location is closely analogous: We learn that we
exist at t, and that t is now. One can easily construct cases analogous to
the tardy professor, which bring out the cognitive significance between the
two pieces of evidence. All of this strongly indicates that we do acquire
irreducible temporal de se evidence when observing our temporal location.
This concludes my discussion of the first worry.
The second worry is that the irreducibly indexical evidence doesn’t war-
rant the updates I claim it does. To see that it does warrant the updates,
I spell out last section’s argument more concretely, in terms of two popular
accounts of indexical thought.
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3.2.1 Property Theory
Lewis (1979) defends a particularly popular account of indexical thought. Ac-
cording to Lewis, an agent’s having de se thought is the agent’s self-ascribing
a certain property. (Properties are understood here in the undemanding
sense: Any set of possible objects is a property.) More specifically, Lewis
thinks that the thinkers of temporal de se thought are the agent’s individual
time-slices. A time-slice wondering whether it’s Monday or Tuesday ascribes
to herself the set of all possible objects located at a Monday or Tuesday. An
equivalent formulation of Lewis’ account represents belief content as sets of
centered worlds—triples of a Lewisian world, an agent in that world, and a
time in that world. (This is perhaps the most popular formulation of index-
ical thought in formal epistemological accounts of indexicality.)
The argument from the previous section is easily translated into Lewis’
theory. For simplicity, I attend again to the finite case, (Finite Universe).
‘I am alive at t’ corresponds to the set of centered worlds with the center
located at an agent who is alive at t (note that the center itself need not
be located at t).10 Conditionalizing on ten-fold reincarnation restricts this
set of centered worlds to those where the agent at the center lives ten times.
For any such world, and any such agent in that world, there are ten centers
representing the ten times when the agent is alive. The singleton of a pair
consisting of the world and one of the ten agent-time centers, say the center
(a, s), represents the belief that one is located in that world and that one is
agent a and that it is currently time s. Given any such world, and any ten-
times reincarnated agent in that world, the epistemic probability distributes
uniformly over the ten centers. The overall result is that, given that I am
alive at t and ten-fold reincarnation, the probability of ‘t is now’ is 1/10.
This is Eq. 7.
Conditionalizing instead on one’s singular incarnation restricts the set
of centered worlds to those where the center is located at an agent who is
incarnated once. Given any such world, and a singularly incarnated agent
in that world, the epistemic probability distributes over the one center given
by the agent and her unique time of existence. This means that, given that
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I am alive at t and singular incarnation, the probability of ‘t is now’ is 1.
This is Eq. 6.
Eqs. 4 and 5—Huemer’s original conclusions—can also be explicitly de-
rived in Lewis’ framework: Of those centers located at a ten-times reincar-
nated agent, 1/10 are such that the agent is alive at t. Of those centered
on a singularly incarnated agent, 1/100 are such that the agent is alive at t.
Applying PI then yields Eqs. 4 and 5, respectively.
3.2.2 Guise-Russellianism
Another popular variant, defended e.g. by Soames (1987), Salmon (1989),
and Braun (2016), holds that the content of an agent’s belief is a Russellian
proposition (rather than a property, as per Lewis). Roughly, a Russellian
proposition consists of all and only those objects and properties the propo-
sition is about. This creates a prima facie tension with the irreducibility of
indexical belief. One might worry that a Russellian proposition can’t play
the role of irreducibly de se content. If furthermore an agent’s belief is fully
determined by its content, then the Russellian can’t account for irreducibly
indexical belief. But most Russellians agree with the Lewisian and Perryian
arguments for the irreducibility of de se belief. Thus Russellians widely ac-
knowledge the need to further elaborate their account.
A popular response is to deny that an agent’s belief is fully determined
by its content. Following Salmon (1989), Braun (2016) considers, besides
the binary relation believes, a ternary relation BEL. This relation relates
an agent, a proposition, and a propositional guise. An agent then believes
a proposition p iff she BELs p under some guise. Importantly, an agent’s
rationality is a matter of the BEL relations she exhibits. (More precisely:
Salmon’s and Braun’s accounts include logical relations among guises. For
example, for every propositional guise, there is precisely one guise that is its
‘guise-negation’. Given these logical relations, Braun states rationality rules
in terms of BEL. For example: No rational agent can BEL a proposition
P under guise x while also BELing P under x’s guise-negation. Note that
on this account it is generally rational to believe both a proposition and
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its negation simultaneously, as long as the negation isn’t believed under the
guise-negation of the proposition’s guise.)
The sentences “t is now” and “t is t” represent two distinct guises of the
same Russellian proposition, (t, t, is identical to). (The Russellian propo-
sition might also be (t, is self-identical); such details won’t matter here.)
Further, none of the sentences represents a guise for the proposition that I
am alive at t. The argument of the previous section can then be translated
to this: Given that I am alive at t and ten-fold reincarnation, I could come
to learn any one guise of the form “s is now” for ten distinct times s (one
of which is t). (Note that, while the proposition picked out by the guise
is tautological, rational agents don’t automatically know a tautology under
every guise.) That is, for any specification of ten centuries where I am alive,
I could have come to BEL any one out of ten Russellian propositions of the
form (s, s, is identical to) under the respective “s is now” guise.
Now, as rationality of binary belief is coded in terms of the BEL relation,
attaching to guises, it’s natural to assume that rationality of graded belief is
similarly coded. In particular, Braun’s logical relations among guises are rich
enough for them to define a sigma-algebra. It is then natural to assume that
the relation encoding the rationality of graded belief defines a probability
function over proposition-guise pairs.
And so my previous argument goes through unproblematically. Condi-
tional on the proposition-guise pair representing my knowledge that I am
alive at t and the proposition-guise pair representing a specification of ten
centuries where I am alive, the proposition-guise pair ((s, s, is identical to),
“s is now”) has probability 1/10, for any s at which I am alive according to
the ten-fold reincarnation thesis. The corresponding probability for ((t, t,
is identical to), “t is now”), conditional on my being alive at t and singular
incarnation, is 1. These are Eqs. 7 and 6 respectively. Eqs. 4 and 5 can be
similarly translated. We see that my previous argument can be translated
into the guise-Russellian account of indexical thought.11
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4 Immortal Thirders—A New Argument For Im-
mortality
Once we account for the total evidence received from observing our present
time, we no longer have reason to update in favor of multiple reincarna-
tion. But the story doesn’t end yet. There’s a new and better argument for
immortality in the vicinity. Indexical evidence will again play a key role.
The basic idea is that there’s a striking parallel between the immortality
setup and the well-known Sleeping Beauty puzzle. The original puzzle is this:
Sleeping Beauty: Beauty goes to sleep on Sunday, planning on
sleeping for two full days. On Sunday night she is told that, in
the night from Sunday to Monday, a team of scientists will flip a
coin. If the coin comes up Heads, Beauty is woken on Monday,
and shortly after put back to sleep. If Tails, Beauty is woken
on Monday and on Tuesday. After being put back to sleep on
Monday, her memory of the Monday awakening is erased.
Now consider:
Immortal Beauty: God creates a universe temporally infinite
toward the past and the future. She decides to run the following
experiment: She starts by flipping a coin. If Heads, She creates
Beauty in precisely one century (singular incarnation). If Tails,
Beauty is created in a countably infinite subset of centuries (infi-
nite reincarnation). Each of Beauty’s lives is no longer than one
century. After creating Beauty, She informs her of this experi-
ment, though not about the outcome of the coin flip. Prior to
the coin flip, God had fixed a plan for when to create Beauty
conditional on either outcome of the coin flip. She also informs
Beauty of this fact; though She leaves her in the dark about what
each plan said, except that the subset of centuries conditional on
Tails doesn’t include an earliest or latest century.
Thirding is a popular view about the original Sleeping Beauty puzzle:
It’s the view that, upon waking on Monday, Beauty should assign credence
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1/3 to the hypothesis that the coin came up Heads (and thus 2/3 to Tails).
Roughly, thirders think that, since there are more awakenings conditional
on Tails, Beauty should update in favor of Tails upon awakening. More
specifically, starting out with a 1/2 credence in Tails on Sunday, Beauty
should update to 2/3 upon waking on Monday.12
The new argument is this: If thirding is correct in Sleeping Beauty, then
0-ing (‘zero-ing’ or ‘nulling’) is correct in Immortal Beauty. That is, after
being informed that she is in an Immortal Beauty experiment, Beauty should
assign credence 0 to Heads and credence 1 to Tails. I’ll make this argument by
going through a series of four intermediate cases, demonstrating the parallel
between Sleeping Beauty and Immortal Beauty. Consider first:
Modified Sleeping Beauty: Beauty goes to sleep on Sunday,
planning on sleeping for two full days. On Sunday night she
is told that, in the night from Sunday to Monday, a team of
scientists will flip a coin. If it comes up Heads, Beauty is woken
precisely once during the next two days. Further, the scientists
have received prior instructions specifying on what day Beauty
should be woken if the coin comes up Heads. Beauty knows this,
but she doesn’t know what the instructions say. If the coin comes
up Tails, Beauty is woken both on Monday and on Tuesday, with
her memory of the Monday awakening wiped in the night from
Monday to Tuesday.
Next consider:
Created Sleeping Beauty: After several significant medical
breakthroughs, the scientists are now able to create adult humans
in vitro, capable of rational thought and with an understanding
of the English language. As in Modified Sleeping Beauty, the sci-
entists flip a coin in the night from Sunday to Monday. If Heads,
the scientists will create Beauty in vitro on one of the next two
days. Which day she is created is again specified by previously
received instructions. Upon creation, Beauty is initially asleep,
and then woken shortly after. Upon waking, she watches a video
16
informing her about the general setup (though not about what
day it is nor what the scientists’ instructions say). Beauty is put
pack to sleep shortly after, sleeping through until Wednesday.
If Tails, the scientists create Beauty on Monday, again initially
asleep. Upon waking, she watches the same informational video
as on the Heads flip. Shortly after, she is put back to sleep, and
any memory she made post creation (including the informational
video) is erased. The scientists wake her again on Tuesday; she
watches the same instructional video13, before being put back to
sleep, sleeping through until Wednesday.
Next up:
Reincarnated Beauty: Pleased with the team’s scientific progress,
God decides to grant the scientists some of Her divine powers:
The scientists gain the ability to reincarnate the deceased. They
subsequently set up a case like Created Sleeping Beauty, with
a few (morbid) differences. The Heads protocol remains un-
changed. On Tails, however, rather than putting Beauty back
to sleep after her Monday awakening, she is given a deadly po-
tion. The scientists then create a new body in the night from
Monday to Tuesday, indistinguishable from Beauty’s when first
created (in particular, the body will carry no memories of any
previous day). With their newfound powers, the scientists then
reincarnate Beauty in this new body on Tuesday.
Next:
Multiply Reincarnated Beauty: The scientists are eager to
test their newfound abilities more extensively. They set up a
case like Reincarnated Beauty, but with the following differences:
Rather than just over two days, the scientists let the experiment
run over n days. If the coin comes up Heads, Beauty is incar-
nated and woken precisely once during these next n days. Again,
Beauty knows from the instructional video that the scientists have
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received prior instructions about when to incarnate Beauty if the
coin comes up Heads; but she’s ignorant about what the instruc-
tions say. If the coin comes up Tails, Beauty is incarnated (and
shortly after given the deadly potion) on m of the next n days.
Again, Beauty knows that the scientists have received prior in-
structions on which m of the n days she would be incarnated
conditional on Tails, but she doesn’t know what the instructions
say.
The argument from thirding in Sleeping Beauty to 0-ing in Immortal
Beauty goes as follows:
Immortal Thirders:
(1) If thirding is correct in Sleeping Beauty, thirding is correct in Modified
Sleeping Beauty.
(2) If thirding is correct in Modified Sleeping Beauty, thirding is correct in
Created Sleeping Beauty.
(3) If thirding is correct in Created Sleeping Beauty, thirding is correct in
Reincarnated Beauty.
(4) If thirding is correct in Reincarnated Beauty, 1/(m+ 1)-ing is correct
in Multiply Reincarnated Beauty.
(5) If 1/(m + 1)-ing is correct in Multiply Reincarnated Beauty, 0-ing is
correct in Immortal Beauty.
(C) If thirding is correct in Sleeping Beauty, 0-ing is correct in Immortal
Beauty.
0-ing in Immortal Beauty means assigning posterior probability 0 to Heads,
and 1 to Tails. Given the setup, Tails is equivalent to the hypothesis that
Beauty is immortal. Immortal Thirders thus shows the following: Given
thirding, an agent, upon being informed that they are in an Immortal Beauty
setup, should become confident of her own immortality. I’ll say more about
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the argument’s further implications later. First, I’ll defend each of the five
premises.
Premise (1) has strong prima facie appeal. The only difference between
Sleeping Beauty and Modified Sleeping Beauty is that, in the latter, Beauty
doesn’t know on which day she awakes conditional on Heads. Whether the
Heads-awakening occurs on Monday or Tuesday intuitively doesn’t seem sig-
nificant for one’s credences upon waking. This intuition can be made more
rigorous. Let P be Beauty’s credence function upon wakening.14 In Modified
Sleeping Beauty she distributes her credence between two hypotheses:
H-Mon : The scientists’ instructions say to wake her on Monday if the
coin comes up Heads.
H-Tue : The scientists’ instructions say to wake her on Tuesday if the
coin comes up Tails.
The two hypotheses are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive; they form
a partition of Beauty’s space of epistemic possibilities. Thus we have
P (Heads) = P (Heads|H-Mon) · P (H-Mon)+ (10)
+ P (Heads|H-Tue) · P (H-Tue). (11)
Conditional on H-Mon the experiment is just the original Sleeping Beauty.
And so Beauty’s credence in Heads conditional on H-Mon should just be
Beauty’s credence in Heads in Sleeping Beauty. And so, if thirding is correct
in the original case, then P (Heads|H-Mon) = 1/3.
Similarly, if H-Tue is true, then the current experiment is just like the
original Sleeping Beauty case but with the Heads-awakening occurring on
Tuesday rather than Monday. But it’s hard to see what should motivate a
different credence assignment to Heads in this modified case. The tempo-
ral position of the single Heads-awakening relative to the Tails-awakenings
plausibly shouldn’t influence Beauty’s credences upon waking.
Several concrete accounts of thirding confirm this intuition. One popu-
lar argument for thirding employs the Self-Indication Assumption (SIA).15
Given SIA, the probability of Heads only depends upon the ratio between the
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number of observer moments sharing Beauty’s evidental state, given Heads,
and the number of observer moments sharing Beauty’s evidential state, given
Tails. In the original Sleeping Beauty, this ratio is 1 : 2. The relative posi-
tion of the Heads-awakening doesn’t change this ratio. Thus SIA supports
Premise (1).
As another example, Elga’s (2000, p.143) first argument for thirding also
supports thirding in Modified Sleeping Beauty: As in Sleeping Beauty, if
Modified Sleeping Beauty were repeated many times over, in the long run
about 1/3 of the wakings would be Heads-wakings. If long-run frequencies
reflect rational single-case credences (in the absence of overriding evidence),
then Beauty should assign credence 1/3 to Heads upon waking.16
The account in Horgan (2004) and Horgan (2008) also supports thirding
in Modified Sleeping Beauty. Horgan assumes that upon waking Beauty
synchronically updates a ‘preliminary probability function’. The preliminary
probability initially merely assumes that it’s either Monday or Tuesday (in
addition to knowledge about the Sleeping Beauty setup).17 Initially it does
not include the information that Beauty is being woken today. This creates
a 4-element partition {H1, H2, T1, T2}, where H1 is ‘Heads and it’s Monday’,
T1 is ‘Tails and it’s Monday’, H2 is ‘Heads and it’s Tuesday’, etc. Horgan
argues that the preliminary probability should be uniform over this partition.
Beauty then performs a Bayesian update on the information that she is woken
today. In Sleeping Beauty, the information only rules out possibility H2. The
Bayesian update thus yields probability 1/3 in each of H1, T1, and T2. It’s
clear from this that the relative position of the Heads-awakening doesn’t
influence the result of Horgan’s account.18
On to Premise (2). A salient difference between Modified Sleeping Beauty
and Created Sleeping Beauty is that, in Created Sleeping Beauty, Beauty
doesn’t yet exist on Sunday. Further, she receives knowledge of the setup only
after she awakes. By contrast, in Modified Sleeping Beauty, Sunday is when
Beauty forms an initial credence about Heads. Certain accounts of thirding
derive Beauty’s intra-experiment credence by updating this temporally prior
credence upon the new indexical evidence Beauty receives upon waking. If
no temporal prior is available, these diachronic schemes will be silent on
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what’s rational for the agent to believe upon waking/creation. Further, even
if there is such a prior, diachronic schemes may suffer from an instance of
the problem of old evidence, as here Beauty receives information about the
setup only after she awakes. In particular, the fact that she is awake might
be evidentially relevant for hypotheses Beauty starts to entertain only after
she registers her being awake. Diachronic schemes can’t easily capture these
evidential connections, since by then Beauty has already updated on the
relevant evidence.
Synchronic updating schemes typically won’t be disturbed by either of
these two problems. On typical synchronic schemes, Beauty’s probability at
any given time is given by a temporally fixed hypothetical prior (or perhaps
‘preliminary probability’), conditionalized on her total evidence at that time.
These schemes won’t be silent in the absence of a temporally prior probability
function; for Beauty’s probabilities at any given time only depend on the
hypothetical prior and her current evidence, not on any temporally prior
probability function. Nor will they suffer from the problem of old evidence;
for the hypothetical prior is newly updated at any given time on Beauty’s
current total evidence.
The two problems seem like defects of the affected diachronic schemes,
rather than acceptable predictions. Silence seems like a defect, since surely
there are some constraints on what’s rational for Beauty to believe upon
waking in Created Sleeping Beauty. Further, the problem of old evidence
is widely recognized as a serious problem, demanding a solution. Thus, the
fact that some diachronic schemes may be sensitive to the lack of a Sunday
period isn’t evidence that Beauty’s credence function should be sensitive.
The sensitivity of diachronic schemes seems like a bug in this case, not a
feature.
Synchronic updating schemes plausibly predict the same post-waking cre-
dence function for Created Sleeping Beauty as for Modified Sleeping Beauty.
For the relevant total evidence Beauty has in Modified Sleeping Beauty after
waking is plausibly the same as her relevant total evidence after watching
the instructional video in Created Sleeping Beauty. This supports Premise
(2).
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On to Premise (3). The only salient difference in Reincarnated Beauty
is that, given Tails, rather than sleeping from Monday to Tuesday, Beauty
is killed and reincarnated. This fact may make an emotional and ethical
difference. But it shouldn’t affect Beauty’s credence in Heads.
The argument for Premise (4) is similar to the argument for Premise (1).
In Multiply Reincarnated Beauty, the scientist’s instructions form a partition
of Beauty’s epistemic possibility space. In particular, the scientists’ Tails-
instructions now too form a (non-trivial) partition. Conditionalizing on a cell
of this partition, Beauty knows which m of the n days would be her Tails-
awakenings. Again, the correct credence function is plausibly invariant under
switching the relative position of the Heads-awakening. (It’s a straightfor-
ward matter to confirm that the accounts examined previously—SIA, Elga
(2000) and Horgan (2008)—agree.) Conditionalizing on any particular set of
Tails-awakenings yields a case like Reincarnated Beauty, but with m rather
than two Tails-awakenings. This suggests that if thirding is true in Rein-
carnated Beauty, then Beauty’s credence in Heads upon incarnation and
watching the video should be 1/(m + 1) in Multiply Reincarnated Beauty.
(Again, the previously examined accounts agree.)
On to the final Premise (5). Immortal Beauty is essentially an infinite
limit of Multiply Reincarnated Beauty, with days swapped for centuries.
The substitution of days with centuries shouldn’t affect Beauty’s probabil-
ities. What about the infinite limit? Note that any one of God’s possible
plans (specifying the time(s) of incarnation on each outcome of the coin flip)
can be conceptualized as the limit of an infinite sequence of scientists’ in-
structions (where each set of instructions in the sequence specifies an earlier
first incarnation, and a later last incarnation, than the previous set of in-
structions). For any finite m, a set of instructions specifying that Beauty
exists at m centuries given Tails yields 1/(m+1)-ing. There is no particular
reason to expect that Beauty’s credences should be discontinuous in the in-
finite limit. So if she should have credence 1/(m+ 1) in Heads for any finite
m, she should have credence 0 in Heads in Immortal Beauty. This supports
Premise (5), and thus conclusion (C): Upon finding oneself in a setup like
Immortal Beauty, thirders should become confident of their own immortality.
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The result of Immortal Thirders can be generalized to further setups.
Immortal Beauty features a coin-flipping deity. The coin flip serves to fix
one’s pre-observation probabilities of singular incarnation and immortality to
1/2 each, e.g. via a plausible application of the Principal Principle. (By ‘pre-
observation probabilities’ I mean probabilities prior to finding oneself in the
relevant setup, e.g. Immortal Beauty. In the following, I will sometimes speak
loosely and call these probabilities ‘priors’, even though these probabilities
aren’t the pure hypothetical priors.) This, in turn, enables a clean analysis
of the problem in terms of unique posterior probabilities. But we can make
do with less; a coin-flipping deity isn’t required for strong pro-immortality
conclusions. Consider the following quite general setup:
Lone Immortal: Some time after being born, you learn that
the universe is temporally infinite in both directions. You are
also informed about the finitude of life: There is a finite number
of years such that no organism can (continuously) survive longer
than that (i.e., any birth of any individual is separated from its
subsequent death by at most that many years). You also learn
that, tragically, you are (and will be and forever have been) com-
pletely alone in the universe. Thrown deep into an existential
crisis, you start contemplating the question of reincarnation.
Despite the generality of this setup, the epistemic state of the agent in Lone
Immortal is still similar to the epistemic state of Beauty in Immortal Beauty.
The salient difference is that Lone Immortal doesn’t include a coin flip to
fix the priors of singular incarnation and immortality to 1/2 each. How do
different choices of priors affect the posterior of immortality?
The choice of priors most pertinent to real life has P (II) > 0 and P (SI) >
0. This is because our actual knowledge warrants these probabilities. For
one, you know that you actually exist sometime. (This piece of evidence
doesn’t favor one incarnation hypothesis over the other; it’s entirely neutral
on SI vs II, as expressed in Eq. 3.) For another, we have some grasp
on the plausibility of various theories of personal identity. These pieces of
information plausibly warrant a non-zero probability for each of SI and II.19
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(To make Lone Immortal closer to our actual situation, we can thus stipulate
that you also receive information about cosmology and personal identity.)
Learning that you’re currently in an Immortal Beauty setup infinitely
confirms Tails over Heads: It sends the 1/2-priors in each hypothesis to
posteriors 1 in Tails and 0 in Heads.20 The same thing would happen if the
coin was biased, provided that the probability for each outcome remained
greater than 0. Suppose the agent in Lone Immortal entertains II and SI
as the only two alternatives (i.e., such that her credences P (II) and P (SI)
sum to unity, P (SI) +P (II) = 1). Then the coin in Immortal Beauty could
in particular be biased to yield Tails with probability P (II) and Heads with
probability P (SI). An Immortal Beauty setup with these probabilities would
remove the disanalogy with Lone Immortal stemming from the priors. Given
0-ing in Immortal Beauty, 0-ing is then plausible in Lone Immortal: Starting
with non-zero probabilities P (SI) > 0 and P (II) > 0, summing to unity,
an agent who finds herself in a setup like Lone Immortal should become
confident of her own immortality.
Now, the agent in Lone Immortal may entertain additional reincarnation
hypotheses, besides SI and II. Indeed, a temporally infinite universe gives
rise to infinitely many different incarnation hypotheses: For every natural
number n there is the hypothesis that you are n times incarnated (in ad-
dition to the hypothesis of infinite reincarnation). This means that there
aren’t only SI and II to consider for confirmation. But, given 0-ing in Im-
mortal Beauty, it’s extremely plausible that II is infinitely confirmed also
over any finite reincarnation hypothesis.21 Given countable additivity, that
entails that II is infinitely confirmed also over the (infinite) disjunction of all
finite reincarnation hypotheses. Hence, even when the agent entertains other
reincarnation hypotheses, she should still become confident in immortality
after finding herself in a setup like Lone Immortal.22
What if the priors for SI and II aren’t both non-zero? In particular, van-
ishing prior for each is a salient option for Lone Immortal. Here’s a possible
rationale: As we’ve seen, there are infinitely many different finite incarnation
hypotheses. If we don’t have any reason to favor any one alternative over
the other, PI may suggest vanishing hypothetical prior for each alternative.
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(The vanishing hypothetical prior here wouldn’t be the result of dogma-
tism, but simply indicative of the size of the sample space.) This scenario
isn’t as close to real life as one in which the agent has additional knowledge
about cosmology and personal identity, but it still warrants brief discussion.
With vanishing priors, we won’t quite achieve confidence in immortality, but
something reasonably close. For in this case it’s plausible that, upon finding
oneself in a scenario like Lone Immortal, there’s a range of permissible poste-
rior probabilities of II, which includes non-zero values. This still vindicates
a weaker version of the desired conclusion: that it is rationally permissible
to substantially increase one’s credence in immortality, upon finding oneself
in Lone Immortal.
To summarize: In cases like Immortal Beauty and Lone Immortal, there
is a sense in which existence is evidence of immortality: If thirding is correct,
merely registering that one is in a scenario like that should convince one of
one’s own immortality.23 (Since the argument is a conditional argument from
thirding, people who are certain of halfing won’t be moved much, of course.
Rather, any halfer will likely accept my analysis of immortality in Section 3.
But I take it that most people, if not thirders, at least lend thirding consider-
able credence [even after hearing the argument for immortality]. Such people
should still update in favor of immortality, in proportion to their credence in
thirding.)
The cases discussed so far still make certain special presuppositions (for
example, Lone Immortal assumes that the agent knows that she is alone in
the universe). As I explain in the next section, these limitations aren’t easily
eliminable.
5 Limitations On The Conclusion
Most literature on Sleeping Beauty makes a certain tacit assumption: that
there are no additional observer moments in the history of the universe with
the same evidential state as Beauty intra-experiment. In a small universe,
this assumption seems reasonable enough. Beauty’s evidential state includes
memories of her recent past, including Sunday. It also includes the knowledge
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that she is currently in a Sleeping Beauty experiment. In a universe with
few observers, these information usually serve to restrict her self-locating un-
certainty to a unique Sleeping Beauty experiment. The assumption becomes
more tenuous though in a universe where it is plausible that there are ad-
ditional observer moments with experiences sufficiently similar to Beauty’s.
(Potential candidates for such observer moments include Boltzmann brains,
or repeated patterns of particles in a spatially infinite universe, or repeated
patterns of particles in a temporally recurrent universe.)
This observation is relevant for extending Immortal Thirders to other
scenarios besides Immortal Beauty and Lone Immortal. Consider
One Immortal Or Many Mortals: God flips a coin. If Heads,
She creates a different person in each of the infinitely many cen-
turies. None of the persons are reincarnated after death. If Tails,
only a single person is created, who is reincarnated in every single
one of the infinitely many centuries. None of her reincarnations
carry memories of any previous centuries. On either outcome of
the coin flip, each incarnation watches a video informing her of
the setup. Beauty finds herself in such a setup, and watches the
video.
What should Beauty conclude about the probability of Heads (i.e., her own
mortality)? The thirding rationale no longer obviously applies. Most ac-
counts of thirding are sensitive to the ratio of the number of observer mo-
ments (lives) with the relevant evidential states, given Heads, to the number
of such observer moments given Tails.24 Indeed, thirders may think that
Beauty’s credence in immortality shouldn’t change upon finding herself in
One Immortal Or Many Mortals. This is particularly plausible if the ac-
count of thirding isn’t sensitive to whether distinct lives belong to the same
person. If a theory is insensitive in this way, it will likely treat the Heads
and Tails outcomes symmetrically. (This is the case e.g. on synchronic ac-
counts of thirding, like Horgan (2008) or SIA: Both accounts will treat the
two outcomes symmetrically, and as a result will recommend halfing.)25
One way to phrase the lesson is this: Whether existence is evidence for
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immortality depends on what can be assumed about the qualitative makeup
of the universe. In particular, it depends on what can be assumed about the
number of lives that are lived, given each incarnation hypothesis. If infinite
reincarnation infinitely multiplies the number of lives, compared to singu-
lar incarnation, then Immortal Thirders applies: Thirders should become
confident that they are immortal.
However, the overall number of lives in the universe might also be fixed,
regardless of the incarnation hypothesis. If so, singular incarnation and mul-
tiple reincarnation would merely amount to different distributions of per-
sonal identities over those lives: Singular incarnation would distribute many
distinct identities, and each identity would only occupy one life. Infinite
reincarnation would distribute much fewer distinct identities, such that each
identity can occupy many lives. If the overall number of lives lived is fixed
in this way, thirders may refrain from concluding their own immortality.
What does this mean for our actual, real-life credences in immortality?
This depends, of course, on our actual priors. Suppose we’re mostly sure
about who exists, but not about how often each person exists. Then we’ll
distribute most of our prior credence between a singular incarnation hypoth-
esis and an infinite reincarnation hypothesis according on which all the same
people exist. In this case, the Immortal Thirders argument should make us
quite confident in infinite reincarnation (it warrants an update in proportion
to our credence in thirding).
But more likely we’ll be quite uncertain about who exists; after all, the
identity relations between persons at different points in time and space aren’t
easily surveyable. If we are (moreover) mostly sure about the total number
of lives lived, we’ll distribute most of our prior credence between a singular
incarnation hypothesis and an infinite reincarnation hypothesis that agree
on the number of lives lived. In this case, Immortal Thirders doesn’t imply
an update in favor of infinite reincarnation.
But more likely, we’ll be quite uncertain both about who exists and how
many lives are lived. In this case, Immortal Thirders implies that we should
increase our confidence in infinite reincarnation relative to certain singular
incarnation theses, but not relative to others. In particular, those singular
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incarnation theses that agree with infinite reincarnation on the total number
of lives lived may maintain their prior confidence level relative to infinite
reincarnation.26
6 Conclusion
I have argued that Huemer’s argument for immortality is unsuccessful, since
it fails to account for the total evidence received from observing one’s tem-
poral location. However, examining the problem through the lens of de se
evidence also reveals a novel argument for immortality. I have argued that
contemplating the probability of immortality is, in certain cases, analogous
to contemplating the probability of Tails in Sleeping Beauty. Those who
advocate thirding in the traditional Sleeping Beauty setup should update in
favor of their own immortality upon finding themselves in scenarios such as
Lone Immortal. We also saw situations in which thirding doesn’t warrant
such an update. Ultimately, I have argued, whether you should update in
favor of your own immortality depends on what can be assumed about the
qualitative makeup of the universe (in particular, about the number of lives
lived).
Notes
1 A probability assignment prior to any evidence at all is also often called hypotheti-
cal prior. For concrete cases motivating the existence of hypothetical priors, see Manley
(“On Being a Random Sample”, pp.15-7). Huemer also appeals to the notion of ‘logical
probability’, which captures “the degree of support” that a set of propositions provides
to another proposition (Huemer, forthcoming, p.5). The difference between my notion of
hypothetical prior, and Huemer’s notion of logical probability, seems negligible for our pur-
poses: Huemer too is in the business of finding out what to believe (and for good reason:
his argument derives its interest mostly from showing that we should have high confidence
in an initially very surprising claim: that we are infinitely reincarnated). For this purpose,
he takes the conditional logical probability of a proposition to directly correspond to an
agent’s ‘epistemic probability ’: “The epistemic probability of a proposition, for a given
observer at a given time, is the logical probability of the proposition given a set of propo-
sitions that adequately captures the observer’s basic evidence at that time.” (ibid., p.5)
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The latter notion can be understood as capturing what an agent should believe in light of
her evidence. Thus the hypothetical prior and Huemer’s notion of logical probability seem
to play identical roles: encoding epistemic norms in the absence of any evidence at all.
Perhaps a remaining difference between the notions lies in what using one or the
other says about a theorist’s views concerning the nature of the epistemic norms encoded
by the probability measure. Theorists of logical probability are perhaps most naturally
associated with the belief that the logical probability of propositions is a unique and
objective, perhaps necessary, feature of the world. Meanwhile, the notion of hypothetical
prior suggests a somewhat more permissive picture, on which sometimes multiple different
priors may each be epistemically appropriate.
2Strictly speaking, Huemer merely requires that the prior probability is monotonically
non-increasing over the centuries: Conditional on SI, one’s incarnation “is initially no more
likely to occur at any given time than at any earlier time” (Huemer, forthcoming, p.8).
But given the universe’s infinite temporal past, this is equivalent to the prior’s uniformity,
given SI. The framing in terms of uniformity is more convenient for our purposes.
3Given countable additivity, this would entail probability 0 that you are ever born, given
SI. This seems like an undesirable result. One may resist it by adopting merely finite
additivity. Mere finite additivity permits a non-zero probability that you are ever born,
despite vanishing probability at each century. I will grant Huemer the denial of countable
additivity for the purpose of this discussion.
4PI isn’t Huemer’s only argument for Premise (1); but I think it’s his strongest. (Ad-
ditionally, Huemer considers a coin flip analogy (Fn.18).) Since I will grant Huemer’s
application of PI, I won’t explicate potential alternative arguments.
5 The easiest way to argue for this might be by establishing that there’s a non-zero
probability that I’m alive in every century. This might be implied by some multiverse
theory together with a revisionary account of personal identity, according to which upon
my local death I immediately continue existence in a counterpart of mine in another part
of the multiverse.
6One might worry about my use of Bayesian conditionalization in connection with
de se hypotheses. For it is well known that diachronic updating on de se hypotheses
can give bad results. For one, it’s often rational to change one’s credence in temporal
de se hypotheses from certainty to uncertainty as time passes. The simple ratio formula
cannot model these transitions. For another, temporal de se information can have different
epistemic significance at different times. (For some discussion of these issues, see Titelbaum
(2014, pp.294-295) and Titelbaum (2016).) The first problem is solved in a framework of
hypothetical priors if the credences at each time are given by synchronically updating the
hypothetical prior at each time on the agent’s total evidence at that time. The second
problem is only partially solved: The changing epistemic significance may be captured by
a hypothetical prior which changes through time. But this raises the question of what the
prior’s temporal dynamics are. Fortunately, I can sidestep both problems here for I am
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only dealing with a single case of synchronic updating. Thus the ratio formula will work
fine for my purposes (barring issues about vanishing priors which arise in the transition
to infinite reincarnation; I’ll expand on this later). Further, my account won’t depend on
any assumptions about the temporal dynamics of the hypothetical prior.
7I am relying here implicitly on the Total Evidence Requirement. One possible for-
mulation of the Requirement is that credence updates should be justified by one’s total
evidence, rather than some proper part of it. Huemer himself accepts the requirement, for
familiar reasons (cp. Huemer (forthcoming, p.7)); so do I.
8Indexical evidence also explains why certain problematic generalizations of Huemer’s
argument fail. For example, it’s straightforward to construct a spatial analogue of Hue-
mer’s original argument. The spatial analogue would entail that, upon observing your
location in space, you should conclude that you are infinitely spatially extended (e.g. that
you have infinitely many body parts scattered arbitrarily far away). It’s a serious chal-
lenge for Huemer’s original argument to explain how the spatial analogue fails, while the
temporal argument remains sound. (Alternatively, Huemer might try to explain how, if
the spatial analogue doesn’t fail, its implication can be accepted.) But once we recognize
that our total evidence includes irreducibly indexical evidence, we can dissolve the spatial
analogue. Our evidence isn’t merely that we are at some spatial location p, but also that
p is here. The conjunction of these two bits of evidence isn’t any more likely given infinite
spatial extent than given small spatial extent.
9By ‘de dicto proposition’ I mean, roughly, a Lewisian or Russellian proposition. I’m
adding the qualifier ‘de dicto’ to distinguish these standard accounts of propositional con-
tent from e.g. Stalnaker’s (2010) account. Stalnaker’s account is (arguably) still a propo-
sitional account but adds additional propositional structure to accommodate indexicality.
Cp. Fn. 11.
10Alternatively, the ‘I’ in ‘the probability that I am alive at t’ can be viewed as de re.
If de re, then ‘I am alive at t’ corresponds to a set of uncentered worlds (e.g., if thought
by Jane, it will be all those worlds where Jane is alive at t).
11 What about a propositional framework on which indexical thought isn’t captured by
guises? Some accounts employ a different entity as the third relatum for the belief-relation;
see e.g. Perry’s (1979) notion of belief states. Any such ternary account will enable my
argument just as well as Guise-Russellianism.
What about accounts on which indexical thought isn’t captured by a third relatum at
all? On such accounts indexicality would need to be treated on the level of propositional
content, rather than guises. Stalnaker (2010) seems to be an example of such an account.
According to Stalnaker, the content of indexical thought is a set of (uncentered) worlds.
Weatherson (2011) reconstructs Stalnaker’s notion of world as follows: “In each world, each
center, in Lewis’s sense, has a haecceity. A world [in Stalnaker’s sense] is the Cartesian
product of a Lewisian world, i.e. a world without haecceities, and a function from each
contextually salient haecceity to a location.” (ibid., p.448) An analogue of my account will
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also go through on Stalnaker’s account. The belief that you exist at t is represented by a
set of Stalnakerian uncentered worlds, in each of which t exists and is inhabited. Suppose
further that you are at center c. Then each such world is equipped with a (generally
distinct) function mapping c’s haecceity to a person-time pair (p, t) in that world such that
p exists at t. Suppose for simplicity that you know that you are person p∗. Consider further
a specific ten-fold reincarnation thesis which says that you, p∗, exist at times s1, ..., s10.
Conditional on that thesis and your existing at t, there are ten distinct functions, one for
each pair (p∗, si), i = 1, ..., 10. When observing your temporal location, besides learning
the Lewisian proposition that p∗ exists at t, you also select precisely one of the ten distinct
functions: the one which maps c to the pair (p∗, t). Again, the prior probability distributes
uniformly over the ten world-function pairs. (For simplicity I consider here a very coarse-
grained notion of world, such that the proposition that p∗ exists at t corresponds to exactly
one world.) Hence, given a specific ten-fold reincarnation thesis, and your existing at t,
the prior probability of t’s being now—i.e., of c’s being mapped to (p∗, t)—is 1/10. This
establishes Eq. 7. The other equations follow analogously.
12Prominent defenders of thirding include Elga (2000), Dorr (2002), Horgan (2004) and
Titelbaum (2008).
13I have been told this situation is similar to Lucy’s predicament in the movie 50 First
Dates.
14This way of speaking presupposes that Beauty’s credence function is the same on each
waking. This assumption is common enough (Pust, 2013, Fn.1), and motivated by the
fact that Beauty’s subjective evidential state is the same on each waking. (However, some
accounts only attempt to determine Beauty’s Monday-credence. For example, Lewis bases
his halfer-response partially on the assumption that Beauty hasn’t yet suffered a “cognitive
mishap”.)
15By ‘SIA’ I understand here what Manley (unpublished) calls Frequency: PE(H) =
n(E∧H)
n(E)
, where E is a piece of de se evidence, PE is the hypothetical prior given E, H
is any hypothesis (de se or de dicto), and n(H) =
∑
W p(W ) · nW (H), where the sum is
over possible worlds and nW (H) is the number of observer moments of which H is true.
It entails Bostrom’s (2001) original, more narrow definition of SIA.
16Though see Arntzenius (2002, Sec.4) for doubts that long-run frequencies should in-
form Beauty’s single-case credences.
17Horgan’s framework of synchronic updating on ‘preliminary probabilities’ is very sim-
ilar to the framework of hypothetical priors. Perhaps the only minor difference is that
Horgan needn’t assume that his preliminary probabilities are prior to any evidence what-
soever; he can assume some prior evidence, such as that it’s either Monday or Tuesday.
18Titelbaum (2008), an example of an explicitly diachronic updating scheme, also seems
to support Premise (1), given plausible assumptions about how to model the scenario as
a ‘story’.
19In the case of II the combination of a non-zero credence in the conjunction of a
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multiverse theory and a revisionary theory of personal identity might do the trick, cp. Fn. 5.
Huemer (forthcoming) convincingly argues for similar points.
20 We can formalize what’s going on in the update for Tails over Heads. I’ll first consider
Multiply Reincarnated Beauty, and then treat Immortal Beauty as the infinite limit. If
1/(m+1)-ing in Multiply Reincarnated Beauty is true, then the posteriors P ′(Heads) and
P ′(Tails) (i.e., the probabilities after watching the informational video), are related to the
respective priors as follows:
P ′(Heads)
P (Heads)
=
1
m
· P
′(Tails)
P (Tails)
. (12)
Now, most thirders think that Beauty achieves her posteriors in Sleeping Beauty by up-
dating on new evidence. (Though some disagree, e.g. Elga (2000).) Let’s assume the
same here. Beauty will then get to her posteriors in Multiply Reincarnated Beauty also
by updating on new evidence. Call the evidence by which Beauty achieves her 1/(m+1)-
posterior in Multiply Reincarnated Beauty I∗. Eq. (12) then implies that
P (I∗|Heads) = 1/m · P (I∗|Tails). (13)
By ‘infinite confirmation’ of Heads over Tails, I mean roughly the limit of Eq. 13 for
increasing m, i.e.:
P (I∗|Heads) = 0 · P (I∗|Tails). (14)
(I say ‘roughly’, since Eq. 14 yields an infinite update in favor of Tails only if P (I∗|Tails) >
0. But even if this condition isn’t satisfied in the infinite limit, the limiting behavior
expressed in Eq. 13 still suggests that I∗ warrants an update in favor of Tails. For, as
we’ll see later, P (I∗|Tails) is plausibly non-zero in every finite case. But then Eq. 13
is equivalent to P (I
∗|Heads)
P (I∗|Tails) = 1/m, for every finite m. Taking the limit of this strongly
suggests that, even if both P (I∗|Tails) and P (I∗|Heads) vanish in the limit, I∗ supports
Tails better than Heads.)
21This can be formalized again as in Fn. 20.
22What if we deny countably additivity here? Then it’s possible that II doesn’t end up
with a posterior close to 1, despite being infinitely confirmed over any finite reincarnation
thesis. But finite additivity still yields a notable result: For any natural number n, you
should have posterior 1 that you are incarnated at least n times. This means that, upon
finding yourself in a case like Lone Immortal, you should become confident that you are
reincarnated arbitrarily many times.
23There is a way to understand the setups which yields an even tighter sense of ‘ex-
istence is evidence of immortality’. As noted before, most thirders think that Beauty
achieves her posteriors by updating on new evidence (Fn. 20). In Sleeping Beauty, this
new evidence is essentially indexical: It’s the information that H1 ∨T1 ∨T2. The analogue
of this information for Multiply Reincarnated Beauty is a disjunction of disjunctions: Each
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subordinate disjunct is associated with a specific set of scientists’ instructions; it is of the
form Hi∨Tj1 ∨Tj2 ∨ ...∨Tjm , where the i and jk specify the days of awakening conditional
on Heads and Tails, respectively. As in (Fn. 20), let’s call this evidence I∗.
Crucially, once Beauty is informed of the setup, she can infer I∗ from another piece
of essentially indexical information: that she is alive now. Indeed, given the background
knowledge of the setup, the two pieces of information are equivalent. Hence, from Eq. 13
(Fn. 20),
P (I am alive now|Heads) = 1/m · P (I am alive now|Tails). (15)
On this view, extended thirders deny (the analogue of) No Update From Pure Indexical
(Sec. 3). To recall, this assumption says that conditionalizing on ‘I am alive now ’ shouldn’t
change your relative confidence in singular incarnation (Heads) or multiple reincarnation
(Tails). But, given the setup of Multiply Reincarnated Beauty, Beauty can infer I∗ from
the fact that she is alive now. And so she should become more confident in multiple
reincarnation (Tails) once she learns that she is alive now.
This expresses a good sense in which existence is evidence of immortality. Note that
it is to be distinguished from Huemer’s original claim that observing your present time
is evidence of immortality. As I have argued in Section 3, observing one’s present time
affords both the information that one is alive at t and the temporal de se information that
t is now. Once the latter piece of information is accounted for, observing one’s present time
shouldn’t alter one’s confidence in reincarnation. Rather, on the account expounded in
this note, you should be confident in immortality already prior to observing your present
time.
24This is most obvious for explicitly synchronic accounts of thirding, like Horgan (2008)
or SIA. For others it’s less clear. For example, Titelbaum’s (2008) diachronic scheme
doesn’t seem to trivially extend to cases where the subject also has agential, rather than
merely temporal, self-locating uncertainty.
25One might think that there are views on which the epistemic situation between the
many subjects on the Tails flip isn’t relevantly similar; and thus that the original thirding
rationale does apply. Consider specifically a view on which each subject is directly ac-
quainted with herself. (The notion of direct acquaintance is supposed to be as in Russell
(1910); though not necessarily with the strong restrictions on the kinds of acquaintable
entities.) On such a view, one’s own personal identity may figure in one’s evidence. For
example, Jane may have evidence of the form ‘Jane exists at t’, where ‘Jane’ denotes
some access-restricted entity, perhaps a personal haecceity. (The entity has to be access-
restricted since the personal identity of others plausibly isn’t directly observable.) At first
glance it might seem that this view effectively reduces One Immortal Or Many Mortals to
a case of Immortal Beauty: Heads means Jane is singularly incarnated, Tails means Jane
is infinitely reincarnated.
But this reasoning is dubious, for two reasons: First, it’s unclear whether acquaintance
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theory isn’t simply another account of irreducibly indexical thought. If ‘Jane’ denotes some
special access-restricted haecceity, it’s plausible that the thought (only thinkable by Jane)
that Jane is in the library just is Jane’s thinking ‘I am in the library’. (This is somewhat
reminiscent of Stalnaker’s account of indexicality, discussed in Fn. 11. One difference would
be that, on Stalnaker’s account, haecceities of centers can be shared between individuals.
It’s also unclear whether on the Russellian acquaintance account the personal haecceities
are superimposed on a standard Lewisian world, as in Stalnaker, or supposed to be part of
it.) Second, even if it doesn’t merely reduce to an account of de se belief, it fails to reduce
One Immortal Or Many Mortals to Immortal Beauty. For now Jane’s evidence includes a
new piece of information which will favor Heads over Tails. The new piece of information is
that Jane—a certain special personal haecceity—exists. Given the setup of One Immortal
Or Many Mortals, one can infer that there are at least as many possible personal haecceities
as there are centuries in the universe (in this case: countably infinitely many). For these
are required by the possibility of the Heads flip. An application of PI then suggests that
Jane should take her own existence (qua haecceity) as evidence against Tails. Indeed, she
should discount Tails relative to Heads exactly by the number of centuries in the universe.
This can be seen as follows: If M is the number of possible haecceities, then the
probability of Jane’s existing conditional on Tails is merely 1/M . For there are M pos-
sible distributions of personal haecceities over centuries compatible with Tails—namely
those which assign a single hacceity to all centuries. Of those, precisely one has Jane
exist (sometime). By contrast, conditional on Heads, Jane’s existing has probability T/M ,
where T is the number of actual centuries. For a fraction of T/M of all personal haecce-
ity distributions compatible with Heads have Jane exist sometime. (There are a total of
(M !/(M−T )! personal haecceity distributions compatible with Heads. Fixing Jane’s exis-
tence at one particular century leaves (M − 1)!/(M −T )! personal haecceity distributions.
This can be done for all T centuries. Hence a fraction of T/M of all personal haecceity
distributions compatible with Heads have Jane exist sometime.)
PI implies that, upon observing her haecceity, Jane should update in favor of Heads.
Once she has done so, the case indeed becomes like Immortal Beauty: Given Heads,
Jane lives exactly once; given Tails, Jane lives infinitely many time. This results in a
probability boost for Tails. However, the resulting boost merely exactly cancels out the
previous update in favor of Heads. The end result is that Jane shouldn’t update in favor
of immortality. This mirrors precisely what the previous accounts already said about One
Immortal Or Many Mortals. Russellian acquaintance theory doesn’t change the conclusion.
26If SIA is true, then the probability boost any theory receives is simply directly pro-
portional to the total number of lives lived according to that theory. And so it’s relatively
straightforward to see that immortality gets confirmed over singular incarnation, on SIA,
iff the former predicts greater numbers of lives lived. But not every thirder accepts SIA.
Hence the conclusions of the main text can’t be strengthened in this way without compro-
mising the broad appeal of Immortal Thirders.
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